Quine’s Critique of Analyticity in Philosophy: A Brief Analysis.

Abstract

This article offers a detailed study of W. V. O. Quine’s critique of the analytic–synthetic distinction and its consequences for philosophy. The notion of analyticity goes back to Kant, who distinguished analytic truths (true by meaning) from synthetic truths (which tell us something about the world). Logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap attempted to sharpen this distinction and make it the secure foundation of knowledge. Quine, in his essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951/1953), argues that the notion of “analytic” is hopelessly circular, and that the boundary between analytic and synthetic cannot be maintained. He proposes instead a holistic view of knowledge: our beliefs form an interconnected web, and any statement—even in logic or mathematics—can be revised in principle. This collapse of the analytic–synthetic line transforms epistemology and philosophy of language, and leads Quine toward naturalized epistemology, integrating philosophy more closely with science.